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Schools as Intellectual and Moral Associations 
Bruce C. Hafen* 
I. INTRODUCTION: EDUCATION THE IMPORTANCE 
OF INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL ASSOCIATIONS 
In one of his remarkable insights about the role of mediat- 
ing structures in American democracy, Tocqueville wrote that 
certain voluntary associations nurture the formation of those 
"habits of the heart" that he called "mores."' By mores, 
Tocqueville meant "the whole moral and intellectual state of a 
pe~ple,"~ particularly the ennobling attitudes that restrain 
individualism's destructive, acquisitive appetites and that de- 
velop each citizen's sense of personal and civic virtue. The 
institutions that best cultivate mores are "intellectual and 
moral associations," which differ from associations formed pri- 
marily for "political and industrial" ends. For Tocqueville, 
"nothing . . . more deserves attention than the intellectual and 
moral asso~iations."~ The "mores" formed in such places are 
"one of the great general causes responsible for the mainte- 
nance of a democratic republic in the United States.'" Indeed, 
"[tlhere have never been free societies without  more^."^ 
By their very nature, "intellectual" and "moral" knowledge 
must be both taught and learned, not merely legislated. Hence, 
institutions of learning play a crucial role in a democratic soci- 
ety because they teach not only the skills that enable personal 
development, but also the skills that enable democracy's own 
meaningful ~ontinuity.~ To this end, American schools have 
* Provost and Professor of Law, Brigham Young University. 
1. ALWs DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN ,AMERICA 287 (J.P. Mayer ed. & 
George Lawrence trans., Anchor Books 1969) (1966). Robert Bellah and his col- 
leagues drew on this phrase for the title of their book, Habits of the Heart, which 
reviewed the state of individualistic attitudes in middle class American society. 
ROBEW~ N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEAWT (1985). 
2. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 287. 
3. Id. at 517. 
4 .  Id at 287. 
5. Id. at 590. 
6 .  See generally Bruce C. Hafen, Developing Student Expression Through Insti- 
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historically been concerned with three different categories of 
"mores." Using Tocqueville's terminology, I will call the &st of 
these categories the "intellectual" or cognitive mores. Category 
I includes basic literacy and numeracy, along with the political, 
economic and other general knowledge required to exercise the 
duties of self-governance. Without such education, democratic 
masses are unable to make responsible electoral choices and 
then hold their elected leaders accountable under the theory of 
the Social Contract. 
Within the more value-oriented "moral" sphere, I see two 
rather distinct additional categories-matters of moral "princi- 
ple" and matters of moral "preference." Category 11, matters of 
moral principle, includes universal values that all citizens must 
understand and accept as conditions of social survival in a free 
society, such as honesty, tolerance, civic loyalty, and some 
degree of personal responsibility. From the acceptance of such 
values comes each citizen's willingness to obey the unenforce- 
able. Without that willingness to exercise self enforcement at 
some threshold level, democracy cannot flourish, or even sur- 
vive. 
Category 111, matters of moral preference, includes personal 
choices that can have significant moral-and social-implica- 
tions, but that will naturally vary from one person to another. 
For example, I would include here the development of the value 
systems that shape one's sense of life's meaning, allowing the 
pursuit of such subjective personal choices as career direction 
or religious orientation. 
To illustrate the distinction I draw between principle and 
preference, consider the example of parental choice in educat- 
ing one's children. As a matter of moral principle (Category 11), 
every parent should ensure that his or her child obtains a rudi- 
mentary education in compliance with state compulsory school 
laws. However, as a matter of moral preference (Category 111), 
parents are free to send their children to either a public school 
or a private school. Some private schools, as distinguished from 
public schools, may have a religious orientation consistent with 
parental religious preferences. A parent may regard a given 
private school's orientation as an essential ingredient in teach- 
ing her child an appropriate cosmic framework for understand- 
ing life's meaning. Because public schools rarely enter the 
tutionul Authority: Public Schools As Mediating Structures, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 663 
(1987). 
6051 SCHOOLS AS ASSOCIATIONS 607 
sphere of moral preference in the sense in which I am using 
that term, parents who send their children to public schools 
must pursue alternative means for teaching their children the 
sense of personal meaning found within Category III's concern 
with cosmic frameworks. American society and the United 
States Supreme Court have balanced these issues of principle 
and preference by acknowledging the right of parents to  direct 
the education of their children in accordance with each parent's 
personal philosophy of life and education, so long as that choice 
also satisfies fked, general standards of educational achieve- 
ment, as well as standards prohibiting child abuse and neglect. 
By educating the nation's children in both the intellectual 
and moral spheres, American schools perform an indispensable 
"mediating" function between the public and private sectors of 
our national life as well as the public and private dimensions of 
each individual's life. 
A school aspires to be a bridge between the private world of 
the individual and the public world of society, helping each 
individual to realize his own autonomous sense of self while 
simultaneously inducting him into membership in the demo- 
cratic community. He [or she] thus learns to give as well as  to 
take from the wellsprings of a free culture. To fulfill such 
contradictory but lofty purposes, the school as  [a1 mediating 
institution must itself be a paradoxical construct, belonging 
both to the private world of the family and to the public world 
of the state. Thus a school must reflect both institutional 
authority and personal autonomy, private values and public 
virtues, excellence and equality, neutrality and advocacy.' 
Against this background, I offer only a modest and general 
observation: if schools are to perform their mediating role i n  
democratic society, legally based policy making should acknowl- 
edge and broadly support the institutional authority schools 
need in order to teach students in all three categories, subject 
to the principle of churchhtate separation in public schools. In 
what follows, I will suggest a few ideas that pursue this policy 
end. 
A review of certain historical developments illustrates how 
- 
7. Id. at 728-29. 
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courts and legislatures sometimes confuse the three categories 
in ways that weaken both intellectual and moral develop- 
ment.' For example, in the two categories of moral education, 
we must more clearly respect the distinction between matters 
of principle and matters of preference. One extreme to avoid in 
this regard is the approach that makes all choices within the 
moral sphere a matter of principle, leaving no room for matters 
of moral preference. This result can follow from excessive con- 
trol by the public side of a school's mediating network, as illus- 
trated by the totalitarian state that seeks to impose a mono- 
lithic order of meaning on each citizen's view of his or her life. 
Another extreme to be avoided is the approach that regards all 
moral choices as matters of preference. This attitude relativizes 
all of the issues having moral or ethical underpinnings by mak- 
ing every moral choice appear to be a matter of personal prefer- 
ence. Only by avoiding such extremes can a democratic society 
maintain schools that produce a citizenry that is "educated" in 
both the intellectual and moral sense. A brief review of the 
history of schools in America will provide the basis for a few 
comments on these observations. 
A. Public and Private Schools 
Let us first consider the public school heritage. In general, 
the center of policy gravity for American schools has, over time, 
moved from the private sphere toward the public sphere. Amer- 
ican public schools originated in the colonial period at the most 
local levels of neighborhood and family, as reflected in the well 
established-but now somewhat less clear-traditions of local 
control and funding from local tax revenues. Indeed, as the con- 
cept of in loco parentis suggests, public schools were originally 
extensions of the home. Because local communities were once 
far more culturally homogeneous than are many communities 
today, this approach often allowed local communities to treat 
their local moral preferences as matters of moral principle. 
Throughout much of the nineteenth century, the wide- 
spread acceptance of Protestant attitudes created a blurring of 
the line between moral principle and moral preference on a 
national scale.g However, increasing numbers of Catholic im- 
8. As I will suggest toward the end of this paper, the newly emerging democ- 
racies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union also need their own sources 
of authoritative masterlapprentice tutoring. See i e a  part IV. 
9. See generally Hafen, supra note 6, at 675 (discussing the development of 
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migrants found themselves unwilling t o  blend their distinctive 
religious values into the Protestant-flavored melting pot of 
American schools. As a result, Catholic families established 
alternative schools that reflected their moral preferences while 
at the same time honoring the most basic principles of educa- 
tional quality and democratic ideals. Nonetheless, some Protes- 
tant majorities had difficulty accommodating this degree of 
deviation from their notion of moral principles in education, 
even to the degree of urging state compulsory school laws that 
required attendance at public schools. 
In 1925, the Supreme Court struck down such a law in 
Oregon, thereby reinforcing the distinction between principle 
and preference.'' Once parochial and other private schools 
have complied with the most basic expectations of Category I 
(intellectual foundations) and Category I1 (universal personal 
values), the Court said these schools are free to pursue Catego- 
ry I11 (moral preference). "The child is not the mere creature of 
the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have 
the right, coupled with the high duty, t o  recognize and prepare 
him for additional obligations."ll These "additional obliga- 
tions" include the privately chosen personal value systems of 
Category 111. 
B. Desegregation and Schools as State Agents 
In 1954, through the vehicle of Brown v. Board of Educa- 
tion,12 the Supreme Court cast American public schools in a 
leading role in the nation's struggle to desegregate a racially 
divided society. The schools' relatively successful response to  
this challenge reflected the best tradition of mediating struc- 
tures, as the schools undertook the arduous task of teaching a 
new "habit' of the heart" t o  American society. In so doing, the 
schools were operating within the meaning of Category 11, 
conveying the expectations of a newly reinforced universal 
value-the elimination of racism. At the same time, the degree 
of judicial and political power required to sustain the desegre- 
gation movement also moved the schools further away from the 
local and private spheres toward the megastructure role we 
associate with the federal government. By casting the schools 
the American school system). 
10. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 US.  510 (1925). 
11. Id. at 535. 
12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
610 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I993 
more sharply into the role of a state actor, the Court made it 
more difficult for the schools to engage in the shaping of 
students' lives in other ways. 
This momentum continued as the Bill of Rights began 
being applied to the school context in due process, search-and- 
seizure, and other cases during the 1960s and 1970s.13 Schools 
increasingly seemed more like typical state agents than repre- 
sentatives of the parental role. It soon became more difficult to 
think of schools as institutions that should mediate between 
the private sphere and the megastructures of government be- 
cause the schools in some sense had become part of the 
megastructure. 
C. Church l State Issues 
The next major chapter in the story of American schools 
involved the churchlstate cases that began with the school 
prayer and bible reading cases of the 1960s.14 In an  important 
sense, these cases proceeded from the Category I1 "universal" 
premise that the state should not interject itself into the purely 
personal value realm of Category 111. However, the experience 
of the last generation has produced a body of evidence suggest- 
ing that both school personnel and the public have exaggerated 
the meaning of the churchlstate cases in two aberrational ways 
that are mutually reinforcing and harmful. 
One of these aberrations is the incorrect assumption that 
the Court's prohibition of religious worship and its concern 
with state aid t o  parochial schools also means that schools 
should not be involved in Category I1 moral education a t  all, 
but should confine themselves solely to the intellectual realm of 
Category I. The other, related aberration is the belief that the 
same degree of laissez-faire pluralism that characterizes the 
state's regulation of personal choices of Category I11 should also 
characterize the way schools treat the moral issues of Category 
11. The effect of this attitude is to relativize values that were 
once considered normative because of their universal applica- 
tion. Taken together, these aberrational interpretations blur 
. 
the distinctions among all three categories in confusing and 
unsettling ways. 
13. See, e.g, Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 US. 683 (1963). 
14. Wallace v. JaBee, 472 US. 38 (1985); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 
203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 US. 421 (1962). 
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In an illustration of how matters of moral principle can be 
relativized to become matters of personal preference, education- 
al researcher Gerald Grant has documented "a shift of profound 
dimensions" in the emergence of a "new adversarial and legal- 
istic character" in urban public schools since the 1960s.15 One 
effect of this shift is that "[aldult authority is increasingly de- 
fmed by what will stand up in court."16 And in a related vein, 
school p e r s o ~ e l  "are no longer sure that they know what is 
right, or if they do, that they have any right to impose it."17 
This attitude is influenced not only by the fear of litigation, but 
also by the prevailing belief among teachers and administrators 
that "children are adults capable of choosing their own morality 
as long as they do not commit  crime^."'^ To the extent that 
such beliefs are accepted by schools, those schools will be un- 
able to teach the moral habits of the heart traditionally located 
within Category 11. 
D. The Anti-authoritarian Revolution 
Another recent chapter from the history of American edu- 
cation, the "student revolutions" of the 1960s, illustrates how a 
passion for personal preference can also undermine the schools' 
ability to teach even the intellectual elements of Category I. 
That revolutionary period questioned the legitimacy not only of 
governmental megastructures, but the legitimacy of all institu- 
tional authority structures, public or private.'' Among this 
movement's most pervasive themes was its questioning of au- 
thority in any form, including the place of authority in educa- 
tional processes and organizations. 'The radical critique shook 
public confidence in the schools and in traditional teaching 
methods by portraying the schools as enemies of true learning 
and instrumentalities of social control."20 Thus, the movement 
"openly opposed the self-discipline, order, and respect for rea- 
son that educational institutions rely on.'a1 This basic rejec- 
tion of authority posed a special challenge to education, not 
15. Gerald Grant, The Character of Education and the Education of Character, 
AM. EDUC., Jan.-Feb. 1982, at 37, 41. 
16. Id. 
17. Id at 42. 
18. Id. at 44. 
19. For further development of this 
20. Id at 679. 
21. DIANE RAVITCH, THE TROUBLED 
200 (1983). 
theme, see Hafen, supm note 6, at 677-81. 
CRUSADE: AMERICAN EDUCATION, 1945-1980 
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only in its moral dimensions but also in its Category I intellec- 
tual dimensions because "[e]ducation . . . is by its nature an 
exercise in authority . . . since the teacher presumably seeks to 
impart something that the student does hot know or cannot 
The issue of authority reveals the paradoxical nature of 
public school education. Schools "mediate" between the private 
and public sphere, preparing children to move from the private 
world of childhood to the public world of responsible citizen- 
ship. We commonly regard mediating institutions as "voluntary 
associations," whose role is to maximize personal liberty-and 
to maximize the social stability that nourishes personal lib- 
erty-in a free society. Yet the "voluntary" association we call a 
public school operates under the mandate of "compulsory" 
school laws. This may seem like an impossible contradiction 
until we realize that children have a particular problem with 
the paradox of authority: because they lack actual as well as 
legal capacity, children have a special need to submit them- 
selves-ven by the force of compulsory laws-to the yoke of 
educational demands in order to develop their own capacity for 
autonomous action. This is not at  all unusual, since mediating 
institutions typically ask individual citizens to yield some de- 
gree of short-term personal freedom for the sake of long-term 
communitarian values. Thus, by challenging the legitimacy of 
all authoritarian processes and institutions, the revolutionary 
era called into question not only the way schools function, but 
the way any intermediate institution functions. 
111. INSTITTJTIONAL AUTHORITY AND THE 
STUDENT EXPRESSION CASES 
Let us explore this problem using the Supreme Court's 
student expression cases as illustrations because these cases 
clearly display the conflict between institutional authority and 
student freedom. In addition, the development of this line of 
cases introduces some recent and s i w c a n t  attempts by the 
Court to restore the capacity of public schools to perform their 
mediating functions in the intellectual as well as in the moral 
categories. 
Until 1986, the Court's experience in the student expres- 
22. Diane Ravitch, The Continuing Crisis: Fashions in Education, 53 AM. 
SCHOLAR 183, 189 (1984). 
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sion area was concerned primarily with protecting the individu- 
al first amendment rights of students. For example, in the 1943 
"flag salute" case, the Court held that a public school could not 
compel students who were Jehovah's Witnesses to pledge alle- 
giance to the American flag because such compulsion has a 
coercive effect on religious beliefs.23 And in the 1969 case of 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dis- 
trict," the Court protected the right of public school students 
to wear black armbands in a peaceful protest against the Viet- 
nam War. Tinker held that schools may not discipline students 
for either actual or symbolic expression unless such expression 
is manifestly d i s r ~ p t i v e . ~ ~  This seemingly unquaMed holding 
left lower courts in considerable doubt about the right of 
schools to control curriculum-related expression that was not 
disruptive. 
In 1982, a plurality of the Court held in Board of Educa- 
tion v.  pic^^^ that students have a right to receive informa- 
tion, which right can limit the discretion of a school board to 
direct the arbitrary removal of books from school libraries. 
However, the Court also implicitly acknowledged that school 
boards have wide latitude in determining what books to order 
in the fmt instance and in exercising non-arbitrary control 
over curricular matters.27 
This ongoing extension of protection for individual student 
interests came to an end in 1986, when the Court held in Beth- 
el School District v. F r a ~ e r ~ ~  that a school could discipline a 
student for giving a vulgar speech in a student assembly. This 
opinion reaffirmed in relatively broad terms the schools' obliga- 
tion to teach citizenship values and to act in loco parentis. 
However, the opinion left some room for doubt whether this 
limitation on student speech would apply to circumstances 
other than offensive vulgarity. 
Those doubts were removed by Hazelwood School District 
v. K~hlmeier,2~ in which the Court held that a public school 
may regulate the content of a school newspaper produced by 
students in a journalism class. The basis for this holding was 
23. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
24. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
25. Id. at 505-06. 
26. 457 U.S. 853, 869-72 (1982) (plurality opinion). 
27. Id. at 863-72. 
28. 478 U.S. 675, 685-86 (1986). 
29. 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). 
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the Court's recognition that schools may control any school- 
sponsored expressive activity, not only within the traditional 
curriculum but in any circumstances that are or may be per- 
ceived as  being school-sponsored.30 This decision resolved 
many post-Tinker doubts by limiting the Tinker rule to private 
student speech that occurs outside school-sponsored activities. 
I t  also reinforced the principle of what might be called institu- 
tional academic freedom, a principle that is crucial to sustain- 
ing the functions of the "intellectual and moral associations" to 
which Tocqueville referred.31 Let us consider the connection 
between these cases and that principle. 
Certain features of the student expression cases are related 
to declines in the ability of schools to educate their stu- 
dents-not that the cases themselves directly reduced the 
schools' educational effectiveness; rather, Tinker was the child 
of an overall environment that challenged the institutional au- 
thority of schools. I have summarized elsewhere certain ways 
in which declining institutional authority in public schools 
since the 1960s has apparently contributed t o  reductions in 
student academic a~hievement .~~ As just one example, the em- 
pirical studies of James Coleman and his colleagues have es- 
tablished strong connections between the exercise of institu- 
tional authority and student performance in both academic and 
behavioral  dimension^.^^ In both public and private schools, 
student achievement improves when schools maintain strong 
disciplinary policies, homework expectations, and attendance 
requirements. Reductions in school authority are most damag- 
ing to the educational attainments of disadvantaged students. 
In addition, students perceive fm disciplinary requirements as 
not only more effective, but also more fair.34 
In some ways, the suspicions about school authority reflect- 
ed in such cases as Tinker and Pico arose not from evidence 
that schools were actually damaging students by authoritative 
interventions, but from the growing ideological belief that be- 
cause schools are part of the governmental megastructure, they 
should not intervene in students' lives, whether in intellectual 
30. Id. at 271-73. 
31. Bruce C. Hafen, Hazelwood School District and the Role of First Amend- 
ment Institutions, 1988 DUKE L.J .  685. 
32. Hafen, supra note 6, at 684-88. 
33. JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., HIGH SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT: PUBLIC, CATHOLIC, 
AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS COMPARED (1982). 
34. See Hafen, supra note 6, at 686-87. 
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o r  behavioral realms. This belief had been reinforced by the 
schools' emerging role as agents of the political state in the 
enforcement of national desegregation policies, as well as by 
the perceived doubt that the churchlstate cases seemed to cast 
on the schools' right to provide moral instruction of any kind. 
Yet, despite the proper legal characterization of schools as 
state actors, the very nature of education places schools in a 
mediating role between each student and the larger community 
in ways that distinguish schools from any other state agency. 
Public education seeks affirmatively to  teach the capacity 
to enjoy first amendment values-to mediate between igno- 
rance and educated expression. [This] is a process that invites 
intrusion, requires authoritarian paternalism, and depends 
upon the exercise of unsupervisable discretion. There must be 
legal protection against clearly harmful abuse of this flexibili- 
ty, but without some strong influence from those apparent 
enemies of personal autonomy in the educational process, 
little serious education is possible. Traditional first amend- 
ment jurisprudence was never designed to deal with govern- 
mental action of this kind, because the original cases arose in 
contexts involving adults and were concerned only with when 
to limit governmental action, not with how to encourage it 
toward such complex ends as educational de~e lopmen t .~~  
The Fraser and Hazelwood cases have now sent the very 
important signal that schools can actually foster and nourish 
the underlying values of the First Amendment-such as free 
inquiry, personal expression, and participatory democracy-by 
authoritatively but affirmatively directing educational process- 
es, not just by staying out of students' way. This is because 
students who lack education also lack the capacity for meaning- 
ful participation in the democratic experiment. Freedom of 
expression has two meanings-freedom from restraints, and 
the capacity for self-expression. Schools can heighten students' 
capacity for self-expression by providing them with effective 
educational tools-which, experience shows, must often be 
authoritatively imposed. Teachers and schools may and should 
also elect non-directive methods that distinctly lack authority 
or that place a premium on student initiative or student criti- 
cism of authority. But the methods chosen, according to 
Hazelwood, are matters of educational philosophy, not matters 
35. Id. at 669. 
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of constitutional law. All of this suggests that a child's right t o  
be educated can be more substantial than a child's right to be 
left alone. In education as in family life, we do not serve the 
long range interests of children when our civil liberties-based 
jurisprudence has the effect of abandoning children to their 
"rights." 
The underlying theory of the Hazelwood case is that the 
institutional autonomy of schools can play a significant role in 
developing students' educated capacities; therefore, by recogniz- 
ing the "institutional freedom" of a school, courts can in certain 
circumstances promote rather than retard the underlying pur- 
poses of the First Amendment. This assumes, of course, that a 
school so protected will shoulder its heavy burden of teaching 
well. 
One year prior to its Hazelwood decision, the Court had 
recognized this fact about such "intellectual and moral associa- 
tions" as schools and churches in Corporation of the Presiding 
Bishop v. A ~ o s , ~ ~  in which Justice B r e ~ a n  stated in his con- 
curring opinion that, "[s]olicitude for a church's ability to [en- 
gage in its own self-definition] reflects the idea that further- 
ance of the autonomy of religious organizations often furthers 
individual religious freedom as well."37 In other words, a me- 
diating institution needs protection from state intrusion not 
only to protect its purely institutional interests, but also t o  
protect the right of its members to draw upon its institutional 
role as a carrier and developer of personal meaning. "The first 
amendment must therefore protect not only individual writers, 
but newspapers; not only religious persons, but churches; not 
only individual students and teachers, but schools."38 
Given the value of Tocqueville's ideas about what "intellec- 
tual and moral associations" can do for both individuals and 
society, the ideal school would teach its students effectively in 
all three categories: I, intellectual knowledge and skills; 11, uni- 
versal moral principles; and 111, a basis for finding personal 
meaning in life. A private religious school that maintains rigor- 
ous educational and intellectual standards is theoretically more 
likely than other institutions t o  fulfill this aspiration because 
such a school teaches the "mores" inherent within each catego- 
ry, perhaps integrating all three categories together. This re- 
36. 483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
37. Id. at 342 (Breman, J., concurring). 
38. Hafen, supra note 31, at 704-05. 
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sembles the ancient mythical model by which the young child 
learns all of life's meaning a t  the feet of a wise master of all 
knowledge. Public schools in the early part of American history 
approached a realization of educational goals in all three cate- 
gories, but before long it was clear that state authority should 
not be employed to  supersede parental prerogatives in directing 
the development of children's personal life orientation in Cate- 
gory 111. 
This recognition of the need to remove public schools from 
Category I11 took the first step in limiting schools' authority to 
teach "mores." The natural momentum of historical develop- 
ment, especially in recent years, has continued to limit schools' 
authority. For example, our longstanding skepticism about 
state involvement in Category I11 has now been transferred t o  
a more recent skepticism about state involvement in Category 
11. If American society's pluralism makes it inappropriate for a 
school to teach particular religious and moral values, we can 
easily begin to believe that same pluralism also makes it inap- 
propriate to teach general moral values--especially in  a day 
when we increasingly, and unwisely, associate all moral codes 
and assumptions with particular ethnic and class-oriented 
backgrounds. 
Having now moved to the point that school personnel "are 
no longer sure they know what is right, or if they do, that they 
have any right to impose it,"39 we may begin to doubt not only 
a school's right to teach principles of character or citizenship, 
but also its right t o  assert institutional authority in the teach- 
ing of Category I intellectual and cognitive principles. The pre- 
Hazelwood student expression cases reflected these doubts. The 
extreme expression of this educational philosophy found a voice 
in the anti-authoritarian revolutions of the 1960s and 1970s, as 
illustrated by AS. Neill's Summerhill school. Neill believed 
that "a child is innately wise and realistic. If left to himself 
without adult suggestion of any kind, he will develop as far as 
he is capable of de~eloping. '~~ 
The view that schools as mediating institutions should not 
authoritatively intervene in children's minds and lives at any 
point along the entire spectrum from Category I to Category I11 
essentially rejects Tocqueville's idea that individual citi- 
zens-children or otherwise-need the institutional constraint 
39. Grant, supra note 15, a t  42. 
40. A.S. NEILL, SUMMERHILL: A RADICAL APPROACH TO CHILD REARING 4 (1960). 
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of being taught the "habits of the heart" that are essential for 
democratic success and continuity. With Fraser and Hazelwood, 
the Supreme Court has slowed the momentum that was moving 
toward this extreme conclusion, but the Court's decisions have 
not been well-received in the scholarly l i terat~re.~ '  Whether 
American schools will build upon these cases and current pub- 
lic unhappiness with public education to  reverse the historical 
tide remains very much an open question. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE NEW DEMOCRACIES 
In the meantime, one wonders what the current vacuum of 
authority in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics 
will mean for the development of the civilizing habits and 
knowledge without which democracy cannot take deep and 
permanent root in those countries. As noted above, we have 
devalued educational authority in the United States by a grad- 
ual process that has continually extended both our skepticism 
about state authority and our commitment to the individual 
right to be left alone. The collapse of excessively authoritarian 
regimes has similarly-yet very suddenly4evalued authority 
in the newly emerging democracies, which predictably promotes 
anti-authoritarian attitudes. In either case, it is natural t o  
expect a continual and at times intense distrust of any authori- 
tarian practice or institution, whether in a government agency 
o r  in a quasi-public or even private institution. 
A friend of mine spoke recently with an educational leader 
in an Eastern European university. The educator asked my 
friend t o  recommend a qualified professor from the United 
States who might come to his university and give a series of 
lectures on moral philosophy. The source of this interest was 
the educational leader's belief that his country has no more 
crucial challenge than to develop the seedbed in which individ- 
ual citizens--old as well as young-can learn to be self-govern- 
ing, not only politically and economically, but morally and even 
spiritually. 
Will abstract lectures on moral philosophy exact from an 
audience the voluntary willingness t o  sacrifice self-interest in 
favor of the public good? What is the source of the personal 
41. See, e.g., J .  Marc Abrams & S. Mark Goodman, End of an Era? The Decline 
of Student Press Rights in the Wake of Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 
1988 DUKE L.J. 706; Richard L. Roe, Valuing Student Speech: The Work of the 
Schools as  Conceptual Development, 79 CAL. L. Rw. 1271 (1991). 
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commitment to obey the unenforceable? I ask those questions 
not only about the new democracies, but about the educational 
wellsprings of American democracy. Tocqueville's answer to 
such questions was clear: 
Among laws controlling human societies there is one more 
precise and clearer, it seems to me, than all the others. If 
men are to remain civilized or to become civilized, the art of 
association [especially the art nurtured by intellectual and 
moral associations1 must develop and improve among them at 
the same speed as equality of conditions spreads.42 
Mary AM Glendon observed that no institutions have 
appeared that take the place of the families, neighborhoods, 
workplace associations and religious associations that teach the 
skills essential to sustaining democratic societies. As a result, 
"paradoxically, liberal democratic welfare states seem to re- 
quire the maintenance in their midst of value-generating insti- 
tutions that are not necessarily organized on liberal principles. 
Yet, perversely, the liberal state and the free market seem to 
undermine the social supports upon which they restaA3 She 
then quotes Francis Fukuyama, who wrote that "liberal princi- 
ples have had a corrosive effect on the values predating liberal- 
ism that are needed to sustain strong communities, and there- 
by on a liberal society's ability to be self-sustaining. . . . Suc- 
cessful political modernization thus requires the preservation of 
something premodern within its f r a m e ~ o r k . ' ~ ~  
One of the "pre-modern" values upon which liberalism has 
a corrosive effect is the value of authority in the necessarily 
authoritarian process of education. A school is in this sense a 
strikingly pre-modern institution-pre-modern not only because 
its processes may require "compulsory" attendance for children, 
but paradoxically, because it is only by submitting to the au- 
thoritative direction of teachers that young people learn the 
skills, attitudes, and understandings without which they can- 
not successfully sustain the operation of a democratic society. 
As Eva Brann has written, "A school is not the world. And yet 
it is a world, a small republic of the intellect within the politi- 
42. '~CQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 517. 
43. Mary A. Glendon, Individualism and Communitarianism in Contemporary 
Legal Systems: Tensions and Accommodations, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 385, 416. 
44. Id. & n.68. 
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cal comm~ni ty . '~~  Thus a school is the place in which democ- 
racy is spiritually created and matured before its students 
enter the temporal place of free markets and the marketplace 
of ideas, once they have developed through arduous learning 
and effort the skills needed for truly autonomous action. To 
prematurely thrust students--or societies--onto this stage of 
total freedom is to put at risk not only their personal survival 
but the survival of the society their collective presence creates. 
So how do democracies, old and new, learn these pre-mod- 
ern survival skills? They need not only constitutions and blue- 
prints, but teachers; not only stock markets and parliaments, 
but apprenticeships and schools of all kinds. The prescription 
for building a successful democracy may be like the prescrip- 
tion for other forms of knowledge that are essentially matters 
of skill, like building a Stradivarius violin: the prescription 
does not-and cannot-exist fully in writing. As Michael 
Polanyi has explained: 
[Tlhe aim of a skilful [sic] performance is achieved by the 
observance of a set of rules which are not known as such to the 
person following them. 
. . . .  
An art which cannot be specified in detail cannot be 
transmitted by prescription, since no prescription for it exists. 
I t  can be passed on only by example from master to appren- 
tice. This restricts the range of diffusion to that of personal 
contacts, and we find accordingly that craftsmanship tends to 
survive in closely circumscribed local traditions. Indeed, the 
diffusion of crafts from one country to another can oRen be 
traced to the migration of groups of craftsmen . . . . [Andl 
while the articulate contents of science are successfully taught 
all over the world in hundreds of new universities, the 
unspecifiable art of scientific research has not penetrated to 
many of these . . . . Without the opportunity offered to young 
scientists to serve an apprenticeship in Europe, and without 
the migration of European scientists to the new countries, 
research centres overseas could hardly ever have made much 
headway. 
I t  follows that an art which has fallen into disuse for the 
period of a generation is altogether lost. There are hundreds 
45. EVA T.H. BRANN, PARADOXES OF EDUCATION I  A REPUBLIC 146 (1979). 
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of examples of this to which the process of mechanization is 
continuously adding new ones. These losses are usually irre- 
trievable. It is pathetic to watch the endless efforts-equipped 
with microscopy and chemistry, with mathematics and elec- 
tronics-to reproduce a single violin of the kind the half-liter- 
ate Stradivarius turned out as a matter of routine more than 
200 years ago. 
To learn by example is to submit to  authority. You follow 
your master because you trust his manner of doing things even 
when you cannot analyse and account in  detail for its effec- 
tiveness. By watching the master and emulating his efforts in  
the presence of his exumple, the apprentice unconsciously picks 
up the rules of the art, including those which are not explicitly 
known to the master himself These hidden rules can be assim- 
ilated only by a person who surrenders himself to that extent 
uncritically to the imitation of another. A society which wants 
to preserve a fund of personal knowledge must submit to tradi- 
tion. 46 
The educational process of transmitting the prescription for 
modern, liberal democracy from one generation to another is 
impossible i7vithout submission in some degree to that pre-mod- 
ern and anti-liberal principle of authority-not the unlimited 
and brutal authority of a "master" toward a slave, but the lim- 
ited and nurturing authority of a "master" toward an appren- 
tice. There was a time when we called this "anti-liberal" pro- 
cess a "liberal education." The educational process--even when 
authoritatively imposed--still has a fundamentally liberating 
effect. 
46. MICHAEL POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE: TOWARDS A POST-CFUTICAL PHI- 
LOSOPHY 49, 53 (1962) (emphasis in last paragraph added). 
